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Quantum Key Distribution with High Order
Fibonacci-like Orbital Angular Momentum States
Z. Pan, J. Cai, C. Wang
Abstract—The coding space in quantum communication could
be expanded to high-dimensional space by using orbital angular
momentum (OAM) states of photons, as both the capacity of
the channel and security are enhanced. Here we present a
novel approach to realize high-capacity quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) by exploiting OAM states. The innovation of
the proposed approach relies on a unique type of entangled-
photon source which produces entangled photons with OAM
randomly distributed among high order Fiboncci-like numbers
and a new physical mechanism for efficiently sharing keys. This
combination of entanglement with mathematical properties of
high order Fibonacci sequences provides the QKD protocol which
is immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and allows secure
generation of long keys from few photons. Unlike other protocols,
reference frame alignment and active modulation of production
and detection bases are unnecessary.
Index Terms—Orbital angular momentum; quantum key dis-
tribution; high order Fibonacci-like sequence .
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURE keys generation between distant users could berealized by using quantum key distribution (QKD) [1],
[2], [3], [4]. QKD is to encode and decode the classical
keys on the quantum state of single photons, traditionally on
the polarization degrees of freedom or the phase degrees of
freedom. The non-cloning principle guarantees the security of
the QKD process, and that any eavesdropping behavior could
be discovered by the communication parties.
However, the high channel loss and low channel capacity are
two main disadvantages of quantum communications. During
the past decades, various approaches are exploited to reduce
the channel loss and extend the communication distance [5],
[6]. On the other hand, increasing the dimension of quantum
systems would increase the channel capacity which brings
several advantages for quantum communication [7], [8], [9].
For example, the coding capacity and the security are increased
along with the increment of the Hilbert space, and with the
increment of the mutually unbiased bases [10], [11], [12], [13].
Here the larger Hilbert space could be realized by using multi-
level atoms [14], [15], hyperentangled photons [16], [17], or
the orbital angular momentum (OAM) state of single photons
[18], [19], [20].
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Especially, by using OAM state of photons [21], several
novel applications in quantum information have been proposed
[22], [23], [24], for instance, golden angle (GA) spiral arrays
can be applied to generate multiple OAM values encoding
well-defined numerical sequences on their farfield radiation
patterns [25]. It may also be possible to combine GA spirals
with spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) in a
nonlinear crystal to engineer a new type of entangled light
source, which produces photon pairs whose summation of
OAM values is a Fibonacci number. This novel setup allows
efficient production of states with large OAM values in quan-
tum communications [26].
Here in this study, we propose a high-capacity coding
method and an efficient QKD scheme by employing high order
Fibonacci sequence recursion onto OAM states to create a
different optical spiral. The third order Fibonacci recursion
provides several properties for us to to improve the security
from eavesdropping through generating encryption keys with
large numbers of digits by using much smaller numbers of
photons.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION USING OAM STATES
ENCODED BY THIRD-ORDER FIBONACCI SEQUENCE
Recently, Simon et al. presented a high-capacity QKD
scheme by randomly encoding the Fibonacci sequence onto
entangled OAM states [27]. Here by introducing the higher
order Fibonacci recursion relation, we start with the third-
order recursion relation as Fn = Fn−1 + Fn−2 + Fn−3,
here we assign the initial values as F1 = 1, F2 = 2 and
F3 = 3. The optical vortices which have been employed for
communication can be generated in several different ways:
spiral phase plate can generate optical vortices with OAM
equals to l~; the transformation from Hermite-Gaussian (HG)
mode to Laguerre-Gaussian (LG) mode can also be useful
to generate the optical vortices we need. Diffractive optical
elements can provide another way to generate the optical
vortices, for example, by using inhomogeneous anisotropic
media [28].
A. Basic setup
Here the source light is prepared in a superposition state
with OAM values equal to third-order Fibonacci numbers
as (1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 20, 37, 68, ...). And we choose N as
the consecutive values, F = {Fn0 , Fn0+1, ..., Fn0+N−1}, and
assign a block of binary digits to each so that equal numbers
of 0’s and 1’s occur. Each photon should be able to generate
log2N bits of information if OAM values in this set are used.
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Fig. 1. Setup for the implementation of QKD with Fibonacci-valued OAM
states. The pump light is used to pump the nonlinear crystal, producing signal-
idler pairs each with three photons through SPDC process. Alice chooses
randomly one photon of each pair to send to Bob and keeps the remaining
two photons. The OAM sorters are arranged to only allow photons to reach
single-photon detectors if they are third-order Fibonacci-valued, with OAM
la1 , la2 and lb. These OAM values fulfill the relation: Fn = la1 + la2 + lb.
Only pairs of values la1 , la2 and lb which sum to Fn values are kept.
For simplicity, we set N = 8 to illustrate the principle for
qubits coding. The third-order Fibonacci numbers from 1 to
68 can be assigned to three-digit blocks as follows: 1 = 000,
2 = 001, 3 = 010, 6 = 011, 11 = 100, 20 = 101, 37 = 110,
68 = 111. Three key digits could be encoded on the OAM
of a single photon. The SPDC spiral bandwidth is able to
span the largest gap in F . It is obvious that both information
capacity and security could be improved with larger sets F .
To simplify the case, we assume that OAM sorters only allow
positive OAM values to reach the detectors.
As shown in Fig.1, two SPDC processes are exploited
for the generation of entangled OAM states in third order
Fibonacci sequence. After the first SPDC process, one of each
pair (lb) is sent straight to Bob while the OAM sorters are
arranged to allow only photons with OAM in F (lb = Fni ) to
register. The other photon(la), however, needs another SPDC
process to be turned into pairs (la1 , la2) before sending to
Alice. The photons reserved by Alice should also be sent
through the same OAM sorters as Bob’s to make sure that only
photons with OAM equal to third-order Fibonacci numbers are
eventually retained. As the collinear SPDC (type I or type II)
OAM conservations implies the relations la1 + la2 + lb = l.
In this case, the third-order Fibonacci recursion forces la1 ,
la2 and lb to be the three adjacent third-order Fibonacci
numbers immediately preceding l = Fn. For example, by
taking l = Fn = F6 = 20, la1 , la2 and lb should be in the set
{Fn−1 = F5 = 11, Fn−2 = F4 = 6, Fn−2 = F3 = 3}.
Moreover, we develop a set of regulations which allows
Alice and Bob to generate the three bits’ communication
through classical channel. And the quantum keys could be
generated by the classical calculation on the shared bits. As
is illustrated in TABLE I, we allocate one binary bit to each
OAM value under the rules as: if (n mod 8) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, then
Bn = 0, otherwise Bn = 1. Here in TABLE I, we can see
that there are only two kinds of bits: B1, B4, B5, B8, B9, ...
are on the ”edge” of each set while B2, B3, B6, B7, B10, ...
are in the ”center” of each set.
Based on Alice’s possible reception of photons, we can
divide all possible situations into 5 categories, as illustrated in
TABLE II. For example, if Alice measures two adjacent OAM
values in the third-order Fibonacci sequence, like |F6〉 ⊗ |F7〉
with (Ba1 , Ba2) = (1, 1) in the third row of TABLE II, then
Bob could have the photon with lb = F5 (Bb = B5 = 1)
or F8 (Bb = B8 = 1). In comparison, the classification from
Bob’s angle is much simple who has only one photon thus
he can only anticipate three possible evaluations for original
OAM value l.
B. The regulations of the QKD protocol
Here we present a set of regulation for both Alice and Bob
to send binary bits to each other in order to realize practical
communication.
As is illustrated in TABLE III, on Alice’s side, her first
rule is that if she obtains two photons with OAM values equal
to Fn1 and Fn2 where n1 and n2 satisfies: n2 = n1 + 2
and Bn−1 = Bn−2 = p, then Alice sends !p to Bob first.
After that Alice will send another !p to Bob after receiving
the responding bit from Bob. Otherwise as her second rule,
Alice sends either Bn1 or Bn2 to Bob first and sends Bn2 or
Bn1 to Bob after receiving the responding bit from Bob.
On Bob’s side, here we also define two rules for coding, as
is illustrated in TABLE IV.
First, if Bob obtains the photon with OAM value equal to
Fn3 where (n3 mod 4) ∈ {2, 3} (Bob’s bit is a ”central” bit).
Then if Bob can dope out at least one of Alice’s values after
she sends her first bit, he would send ”1”; otherwise he would
send ”0” to illustrate his inability to dope out any of Alice’s
values. This is called the recognition flag for it allows Bob to
tell Alice if he is able to dope out at least one OAM value
of hers from only the first bit she sends. To be more clear
in this situation, if Alice sends Bob Ba1 6= Bb = Bn3 , then
Bob sends ”1”. Or he sends ”0” on condition that he receives
Alice’s result as Ba1 = Bb = Bn3 .
Second, if Bob has the photon with OAM value equal to
Fn3 where (n3 mod 4) ∈ {0, 1} (Bob’s bit is an ”edge” bit).
If Alice sends him Ba1 6= Bb, then Bob sends the recognition
flag as is stated in 1, which is ”1” in this particular case.
Otherwise if Alice sends Bob Ba1 = Bb, then Bob sends
!(n3 mod 4) to Alice. This would illustrate if Bob’s bit is on
the ”right” edge or the ”left” edge of its set.
The whole regulation is showed in TABLE V.
C. The procedures of QKD
Now we analyse the procedures of QKD in detail. First we
assume x = (−1)3−(n3 mod 4) to simplify the discussion below
and express the exchange process from Bob’s perspective.
Bob has the photon with OAM value equal to Fn3 where
(n3 mod 4) ∈ {2, 3}(Bob’s bit is a central bit).
1) If Alice sends Bob Ba1 6= Bb = Bn3 , then it will be
easy for Bob to know exactly which OAM value Alice
has.
a) Alice sends her bit according to her second rule.
This means that Alice has |Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3+2∗x〉,
so she would surmise that Bob’s photon |Fb〉 =
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fn 1 2 3 6 11 20 37 68 125 230
Sending bits (Bn) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Center(c) or edge(e) e c c e e c c e e c
TABLE I
THE BIT ALLOCATED FOR EACH OAM VALUE.
Alice Bob
type (la1 , la2) (Ba1 , Ba2) type lb Bb
adjacent
(c,c) (F6, F7) (1,1) e F5/F8 1/1
(c,e) (F7, F8) (1,1) c/e F6/F9 1/0
(e,e) (F8, F9) (1,0) c F7/F10 1/0
discontinuous (c,e) (F6, F8) (1,1) c F7 1
(F7, F9) (1,0) e F8 1
TABLE II
THIS TABLE STATES ALL FIVE POSSIBLE SITUATIONS REGARDING ALICE’S RECEPTION OF PHOTONS. BOB’S POSSIBLE RECEPTION IN EVERY SITUATION
IS ALSO GIVEN. THE OAM VALUES GIVEN HERE (la1 , la2 , lb) ARE ONLY EXAMPLES TO ELABORATE.
Alice (Fa1 = Fn1 , Fa2 = Fn2 ) The first bit Alice The second bit Alicesends to Bob sends to Bob
n2 = n1 + 2, Bn−1 = Bn−2 = p !p !p
n2 = n1 + 2, Bn−1 6= Bn−2 Bn1(Bn2) Bn2 (Bn1)n2 = n1 + 1
TABLE III
ALICE’S REGULATIONS.
Bob’s bit Bb (c/e) The first bit Bob The bit Bob sends to Alice(Fb = Fn3 ) receives from Alice(Ba1)
c
Ba1 6= Bb 1
Ba1 = Bb 0
e
Ba1 6= Bb 1
Ba1 = Bb !(n3 mod 4)
TABLE IV
BOB’S REGULATIONS.
Alice(n1, n2) Bob(n3) Alice sends to Bob Bob sends to Alice Alice sends to Bob
n2 = n1 + 2, Bn−1 = Bn−2 = p
c
!p 6= Bb 1 !p
!p = Bb 0 !p
e
!p 6= Bb 1 !p
!p = Bb !(n3 mod 4) !p
n2 = n1 + 2, Bn−1 6= Bn−2 c
Bn1(Bn2) 6= Bb 1 Bn2(Bn1)
or
Bn1(Bn2) = Bb 0 Bn2(Bn1)
e
Bn1(Bn2) 6= Bb 1 Bn2(Bn1)
n2 = n1 + 1 Bn1(Bn2) = Bb !(n3 mod 4) Bn2(Bn1)
TABLE V
THE WHOLE REGULATIONS.
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|Fn3〉 or |Fb〉 = |Fn3+3∗x〉. If Bob has |Fn3+3∗x〉,
he will only be able to dope out one of Alice’s
value through her first bit if she sends Bn3+x. If
he has |Fn3〉 , he will only be able to know any
one of Alice’s value through her first bit if she
sends Bn3+2∗x. So Bob sending the recognition
flag would be sufficient for Alice to deduce what
OAM value Bob has.
Because Bob’s bit is a central bit, its minimum
distance to the nearest opposite bit should be 2
(The distance between Fn and Fm is defined as
|n−m|), and the nearest opposite bit is Bn3+2∗x.
So Bob surmises that Alice should own |Fn3+2∗x〉.
Also because all three OAM values Alice and Bob
share should be three adjacent third-order Fiboncci
numbers, and because Bob already has |Fn3〉, he
can deduce that Alice should also own |Fn3+x〉
which is between |Fn3+2∗x〉 and |Fn3〉.
So after receiving Bob’s response bit, Alice would
send Bn3+2∗x which is equal to Bn3 .
b) Alice sends her bit according to her first rule.
So she has |Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉 and she sends
!Bn3+x and !Bn3−x respectively to Bob regardless
of the order while !Bn3+x =!Bn3−x 6= Bb = Bn3 .
In this situation, she already knows that Bob’s
value is Fn3 . So what bit Bob would send doesn’t
actually matter here for it won’t affect Alice’s
correct guess of Bob’s OAM value.
It is worth mentioning that the second rule would
not be confused with the first rule as there is only
one opposite bit within the maximum distance to
Bn3 to maintain that all three OAM values are
adjacent: Bn3+2∗x. So when two opposite bits are
sent to Bob, this contradiction would eliminate the
possibility of the second rule. During the com-
munication under Alice’s second rule, Bob would
receive ”01” while under her second rule he would
receive ”00”, which would be sufficient for him to
distinguish the two cases.
In both cases above Alice should have |Fn3+x〉. So Bob
should send Alice ”1” to illustrate that he is able to
identify one of Alice’s value.
2) If Alice sends Bob Ba1 = Bb = Bn3 , then she can only
be sending it according to her first rule.
So Alice could have sent any one in
{Bn3+x, Bn3−x, Bn3−2∗x} and she could have
|Fn3+2∗x〉 ⊗ |Fn3+x〉 or |Fn3−x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−2∗x〉 . As
the two possibilities share no common value of Alice,
Bob should send ”0” to illustrate his inability to
acknowledge any of Alice’s bits.
a) If Alice has |Fn3+2∗x〉 ⊗ |Fn3+x〉 , she would
surmise that Bob has |Fn3+3∗x〉 or |Fn3〉 , each
requires a different bit from Alice in order to
identify one of Alice’s values. This is the same
as 1.(a) and Bob would be able to acknowledge all
of Alice’s values after receiving all two bits from
her.
b) If Alice has |Fn3−x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−2∗x〉 , she would
surmise that Bob has |Fn3−3∗x〉 or |Fn3〉. If Bob
has |Fn3−3∗x〉 , he would be able to identify one
of Alice’s bit through the first bit from her. He
wouldn’t if he has |Fn3 〉 .
So sending the recognition flag here can still help Alice
know Bob’s value. After that, Alice would send the other
bit she has to Bob, which should be able to make Bob
fully aware of Alice’s values.
Bob has the photon with OAM value Fb = Fn3 while (n3
mod 4) ∈ {0, 1}. (Bob’s bit is an ”edge” bit.)
1) If Alice sends Bob Ba = Bb = Bn3 , then Bob will know
that Ba ∈ {Bn3+x, Bn3+2∗x}. Alice should possess
|Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3+2∗x〉 or |Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉, with a
common value |Fn3+x〉. So Bob sends ”1”.
a) If Alice has |Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉 , then she knows
that Bob’s value is Fn3 . So what bit Bob would
send doesn’t actually matter here for it won’t affect
Alice’s correct guess of Bob’s OAM value.
After Bob sends his bit to Alice, Alice would send
another bit of hers to Bob, which is opposite to
the first bit she sent to Bob. And because Bob’s
bit is surrounded closely by two different bits, this
would be enough for Bob to know the exact bits
Alice has.
b) If Alice has |Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3+2∗x〉, she would only
surmise that Bob has |Fn3〉 or |Fn3+3∗x〉. Because
those two bits are of the same category (they are
both ”edge” bits), their only difference is whether
they are on the ”left” or the ”right” side of their
set. We stipulate that if Bob’s bit (Bb) is on the
”left” edge of its set, or in another way, Bb−1 6=
Bb and Bb+1 = Bb, then Bob would send ”1” to
Alice, otherwise if Bb−1 = Bb and Bb+1 6= Bb,
then Bob would send ”0” to Alice, which forms
Bob’s second rule to send!(n3 mod 4). This would
be sufficient for Alice to acknowledge Bob’s value.
After this, Alice would send another bit of hers
to Bob, leading to their full understanding of each
other’s values.
2) If Alice sends Bob Ba 6= Bb = Bn3 , she should possess
|Fn3+x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉 or |Fn3−2∗x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉.
a) If Alice has |Fn3+x〉⊗|Fn3−x〉, Alice would know
Bob’s value needless of his bit. And she would be
able to inform him of his value later with another
bit like in 1.(a).
b) If Alice has |Fn3−2∗x〉 ⊗ |Fn3−x〉, she should
surmise that Bob has |Fn3−3∗x〉 or |Fn3〉. Because
if Bob has |Fn3−3∗x〉 , he can’t determine what
value Alice has (let’s assume that B0 = 1 to accord
the third-order Fibonacci recursion) while he can
if he has |Fn3〉. So Bob could send the recognition
flag to Alice as is stated in Bob’s rule.
After that Alice would send another bit of hers
to pass on all the information Bob needs to know
Alice’s values.
After these process, Alice and Bob can add up their values
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to get the pump value, which serves as one segment of the
key.
III. THE SECURITY PERFORMANCE OF THE QKD
PROTOCOL
Traditionally, the security checking of the protocol is based
on the polarization degrees of freedom. In the proposed QKD
protocol, by randomly choosing the photons in the checking
mode, the two communication parties could discover the
eavesdropping behavior [29]. Moreover, the security checking
process could be realized by using the OAM degrees of
freedom. During the detection of eveasdropping, if Alice
measures {la1 , la2} = {6, 20}, the state reaches Bob should
be |11〉; if Alice measures {la1 , la2} = {3, 6} or {la1 , la2} =
{20, 37}, the state reaches Bob should be 1√
2
{|2〉+ |11〉} or
1√
2
{|11〉 + |68〉}. Suppose there is an eavesdropper in the
channel, called Eve, who perform the intercept-resend attack
on the protocol. For example, she intercepts Bob’s photon and
reads out the value lb = 11. However, she could not able to
know what photon to resend to Bob: |11〉, 1√
2
{|2〉+ |11〉} or
1√
2
{|11〉+ |68〉}. The wrong photons would change the right
distribution of each value in Bob’s measurement, which would
expose her eveasdropping. And it’s worth mentioning that
as shown in TABLE VI, the classical information exchanged
between Alice and Bob is insufficient for an eavesdropper to
determine the value.
Assuming an intercept-resend attack is performed by Eve,
the average probability of a correct guess is 37.92%. The prob-
ability would drop according to the increment of the number
of Fibonacci values used. Also the protocol is intrinsically
immune to photon-number splitting attack. If a multi-photon
pulse is sent into the spiral source, there is no reason for
the photons that come out to be in the same state: they are
distributed among the different third-order Fibonacci numbers
in the same manner as they would if they had been sent one
by one. Siphoning off one photon from a pulse will reveal
nothing about the state of the other photons in that pulse to
the eavesdropper, thus making the attack invalid for Eve.
Moreover, the security checking could be improved by
simply changing some unnecessary bits of Alice into the
random bits. From the procedure analysis of the protocol, we
know that under certain circumstances, Bob would be able to
acknowledge at least one value of Alice’s through only the
first bit of hers. If we change this bit into a random bit or to
indicate the method of calculating secret keys, to add up or to
multiply for example, the ambiguity will be increased, making
it harder for Eve to guess the right value from the classical
information exchange. Meanwhile we can make simple rules
to determine how to process the values when Bob knows all
of them to get the secret keys.
Here we simply change that bit into the random bit. For
every case in which Bob would be able to know all Alice’s
values, we stipulate they choose the smallest two values to
add up to get the secret key. The result is shown in TABLE
VII. For every case in which Bob would be able to know all
Alice’s values, we assume that they choose the smallest two
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Fig. 2. Bit rate, after error correction and privacy amplification, vs fiber
length for QKD protocols with respective coding space of SAM, 8 OAM
states and 480 OAM states.
values to add up to get the secret key. The result is shown in
TABLE VII.
This table has shown the first step in improving the protocol,
and Eve’s average correct guessing rate will be decreased to
27.32%.
Some values, like ”3”, ”355”, are actually calculated in
several different cases(000, 001). This is because in every case
in which Bob can acknowledge all Alice’s values, we stipulate
that the smallest two values be added to get the secret key.
By choosing the values with common rules to avoid as many
overlap as possible, further improvement can be achieved.
Here if we stipulate that they choose digits and the calculating
method (add or multiply) differently according to (n3 mod 4)
(lb = ln3), the average correct guess rate can be decreased to
22.01%, as shown in TABLE VIII.
Notice that the distribution of possibilities regarding every
classical information exchange case is not balanced. So we
can only retain the cases with a relatively better performance
(with more possible secret key values) to further improve the
protocol. As an extreme case, we only retain the results of
the classical information exchange ”010” (the case with the
most possible key values) and discarded all the others, we
may achieve a minimum Eve’s correct guessing rate as 10%.
For a coding space of N Fibonacci values, this rate can
be decreased to 910∗(N+1) , with information entropy density
increased to log2
10∗(N+1)
9 per photion. Here we numerically
simulated the performance of the protocol in Fig.2 and Fig.3.
First in Fig.2, the relation between the keys rate and the
communication distance is presented. Here the frequency frep
is set as 10MHz, the intensity of pulse is 0.1 photon per pulse
and the channel loss of the fiber is 0.2dB/km. The efficiency
of the detector is set as 0.1, and the dark count of the detector
is 10−4 per second. The imperfect interference or polarization
contrast induced quantum bit error rate is neglected. We found
that the keys generation rate increases with the increment of
coding space of the OAM states. In Fig.3, we present the
relation of the coding bits and security performance with
different coding space. In Fig.3(a), the bits values of each
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Fig. 3. Figure (a), (b) shows that information entropy carried by every
photon and eavesdropping detection rate increase with the enlargement of
coding space. Both figures give the performance of both Fibonacci and non-
Fibonacci OAM protocols.
photon is enlarged by using our protocol compared with
traditional method without Fibonacci. And in Fig.3(b), the
security of the protocol is improved as the eavesdropping
behavior will easily be discovered.
IV. SUMMARY
In summary, exploiting the OAM states based on third-order
Fibonacci recursion, we proposed a high-capacity encoding
scheme for quantum key distribution. The secure key distribu-
tion is realized by using three particles entangled state and
third-order Fibonacci sequence which could be generalized
to high-order sequence and multi-parties quantum network.
Compared with the traditional method, the probability for
detecting the eavesdropper could be increased to 90% with
only N = 8 OAM values, which can be further improved
with the increment of the number of OAM values used. Also
the protocol is intrinsically immune to photon splitting attack
and the security can be further enhanced implementing a new
type of decoy state.
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Eve sees 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Secret key 6,11 20,423 11,20,68,125,423 20,37,230 37,230 68,125
20,37,230,
423
6,11,37,
125,230
TABLE VI
IN THE TOP ROW, THE FIRST AND THE THIRD DIGIT IN EACH PAIR ARE THE CLASSICAL BITS SENT BY ALICE SEPARATELY, THE SECOND DIGIT IS THE BIT
SENT BY BOB. THE SECOND ROW SHOWS ALL CORRESPONDING POSSIBLE SECRET KEYS.
Eve sees 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Secret key 3,5,355 3,9,355 9,17,26,162,193
9,17,26,
162,193 31,105 31,105,57
2,14,17,
31,105,
193,298
2,14,17,
31,105,
193,298
TABLE VII
IN THE TOP ROW, THE FIRST AND THE THIRD DIGIT IN EACH PAIR ARE THE CLASSICAL BITS SENT BY ALICE SEPARATELY, THE SECOND DIGIT IS THE BIT
SENT BY BOB. THE SECOND ROW SHOWS ALL CORRESPONDING POSSIBLE SECRET KEYS.
Eve sees 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Secret key 3,6,11
2,20,
423,
28750
2,14,51,17,
31,105,193,
298,13125,
44390
0,33,30,
66,2516,
15640,
8500
9,17,26,
162,193
1147,
3876
18,66,99,
120,340,
4625,
7141,
8500
37,31,
230
220,68,
125
TABLE VIII
IN THE TOP ROW, THE FIRST AND THE THIRD DIGIT IN EACH PAIR ARE THE CLASSICAL BITS SENT BY ALICE SEPARATELY, THE SECOND DIGIT IS THE BIT
SENT BY BOB. THE SECOND ROW SHOWS ALL CORRESPONDING POSSIBLE SECRET KEYS.
